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I. INTRODUCTION
The past history of entitlement programs suggests that once access is
granted, an ethic of individual autonomy, which respects all wishes of its
recipients, reigns supreme. A citizen ethic for both doctor and patient is
necessary in order to distinguish between insatiate individual wishes and a

responsible choice for needed care.'

In 1992, Baby K was born in a Virginia hospital with anencephaly. Infants with this condition are missing most of their brain at birth
and they have a brainstem which irregularly drives breathing along
with ingestion and digestion of food. Baby K was "permanently unconscious," without hope of recovery from this condition. To survive,

1. Marion Danis & Larry R. Churchill, Autonomy and the Common Weal, 21
30 (1991).

HASTINGS CENTER REP. 25,
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Baby K intermittently required the assistance of a mechanical ventilator. Baby K's mother, Ms. H, wanted ventilator care for the baby

whenever necessary.' In contrast, the Hospital, a division of INOVA
Health Systems (the Hospital), and Baby K's physicians wished to follow the accepted standard of care for anencephalic infants and to provide only comfort measures for Baby K.3
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the Hospital a
declaratory order that would have allowed the physicians to provide
standard comfort measures for Baby K. 4 Basing its opinion on the
Emergency Medical Transport and Active Labor Act (EMTALA),5 the
Fourth Circuit held that the Hospital was obliged to provide all necessary respiratory assistance to keep Baby K alive.' The court explained:
"[w]e recognize the dilemma facing physicians who are requested to

provide treatment they consider morally and ethically inappropriate, but
we cannot ignore the plain language of the statute." 7
Until this ruling, physicians made decisions whether to use techno-

logical assistance for a terminally ill infant within the framework of
2. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1024-25 (E.D. Va. 1993), affid, 16 F.3d 590 (4th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 91 (1994).
3. See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Infants with Anencephaly as Organ Sources: Ethical Considerations, 89 PEDIATRICS 1116 (1992) (explaining
that customary medical care for anencephalic infants includes warmth and feeding but no
major medical interventions); ROBERT F. WEIR, SELECTIVE NON-TREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS: MORAL DILEMMAS IN NEONATAL MEDICINE 41 (1984) (explaining that
no treatment is possible, so nursing care consists of holding the anencephalic infant); American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Treatment of Critically Ill Newborns,
72 PEDIATIuCs 565 (1983) (explaining that anencephalic infants are "so impaired that
treatment will serve only to maintain biologic functions").
4. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (Supp. 1 1990) (Stating:
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any individual (whether or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter) comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the individual's behalf for examination
or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must provide for an appropriate
medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital's emergency
department, including ancillary services routinely available to the emergency department, to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition (within the
meaning of subsection (e)(1) of this section) exists.).
6. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.
7. Id.
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federal and state law. Federal statutory law provides physicians guide-

lines for end-of-life decisions in severely disabled newborns. 8 As well,
the federal courts have allowed physicians to make decisions on these
patients within the accepted standard of care, even when the patient is
disabled.9 State law governs medical standards of care and allows physicians to refuse to provide care that violates their professional and
ethical principles."
After the Baby K ruling, physician decisions regarding terminally
ill newborns may be controlled by the irrational beliefs of surrogates.

Even if a patient is terminally ill, all care necessary to keep the patient
alive may be demanded and must be provided, though it may be
against the physician's best judgment. This Comment will propose that
the Fourth Circit's decision does not comport with federal nor state

law. It will suggest that when dealing with irrational requests for lifesustaining measures, the federal courts must interpret EMTALA as it

fits within existing law. This should provide appropriate latitude for
physician judgment that is based upon established medical standards of
care. The Comment will propose that specialty physician groups can
provide clear guidelines for physicians to address requests for life-prolonging measures in such patients," while the law can assure that
practitioners maintain "openness, due process, and meticulous accountability. 12 It will emphasize the crucial role of medical and legal pro-

8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101 to 5107 (1988); See also infra Part III.C.2.
9. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1984) (stating
that Congress had no intention for the Rehabilitation Act to establish standards of care for
terminally ill newborns).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie 1992).
11. Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325
NEw ENG. J. MED. 512, 514 (1991) [hereinafter Miles]. The statements of the following
professional organizations provide standards for end-of-life decisions: Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs, AMA, Guidelinesfor the Appropriate Use of Do Not Resuscitate Orders,
265 JAMA 1868 (1991); Task Force on Ethics of the Society of Critical Care Medicine,
Consensus Report on the Ethics of ForegoingLife-sustaining Treatments in the Critically Ill,
18 CRrrICAL CARE MED. 1435 (1990); American Thoracic Society Position Paper, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-sustaining Therapy, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 478 (1991); The
Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State (PVS),
330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1499-1508, 1572-1597 (1994); Susanna E. Bedell et al., Survival
After Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in the Hospital, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 569 (1983).
12. Miles, supra note 11 at 514.
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fessionals in developing practice guidelines which help form the social
consensus for necessary rationing of health care dollars in such cases. 3 Finally, it will discuss the need for and likelihood of legislative
reform of EMTALA.
II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Facts

Baby K was born to Ms. H on October 13, 1992 in an acute care
hospital in Virginia. 4 Baby K was bom with anencephaly which results in extremely primitive movements and mentation throughout life
because of the absence of most of the brain. 5 According to Virginia
law, Baby K was considered alive because she had a functioning
brainstem. 6 Most anencephalic infants die within days of birth. 7
When Ms. H was informed that her fetus had anencephaly, she refused

13. See Marshall B. Kapp, Futile Medical Treatment: A Review of the Ethical Arguments and Legal Holdings, 9 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 170, 173 (1994) [hereinafter Kapp]
(citing Peter A. Singer & Mark Siegler, Advancing the Cause of Advance Directives, 152
ARCHmES INTENAL MED. 22-24 (1992) ("[p]ractice parameters based on an intervention's
futility should be set at the institutional or societal . . . levels, not at the individual bedside,
so that uniform criteria can be . . . applied to different patients"); Robert M. Veatch &
Carol Mason Spicer, Medically Futile Care: The Role of the Physician in Setting Limits, 18
AM. J.L. & MED. 15, 15-36 (1992) (stating that the only acceptable grounds for overriding
the wishes of a patient or surrogate is when society decides on withholding those resources)).
14. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1024-25.
15. Id. at 1024 (Stating:
Anencephaly is a congenital defect in which the brain stem is present but the
cerebral cortex is rudimentary or absent There is no treatment that will cure, correct, or ameliorate anencephaly. Baby K is permanently unconscious and cannot
hear or see. Lacking a cerebral function, Baby K does not feel pain. Baby K has
brain stem functions primarily limited to reflexive actions such as feeding reflexes
(rooting, sucking, swallowing), respiratory reflexes (breathing, coughing), and reflexive responses to sound or touch. Baby K has a normal heart rate, blood pressure,
liver function, digestion, kidney function, and bladder function and has gained
weight since her birth.).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2972 (Michie 1988).
17. American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Bioethics, Infants with Anencephaly as Organ Sources: Ethical Considerations, 89 PEDIATRICs 1116 (1992).
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the option to abort the fetus.' 8 Because Baby K had respiratory difficulty at birth, Ms. H requested, and the baby received, resuscitation
and was placed on a mechanical ventilator. 9 Baby K's physicians,
Baby K's biological father, Baby K's appointed guardian ad litem, and
members of the hospital ethics committee all suggested ventilator care
be withheld. ° They all felt that because the baby had anencephaly,
further mechanical ventilation would only prolong Baby K's inevitable
death, and that, therefore, only comfort measures should be provided. 2 ' However, Ms. H rejected this position in favor of providing Baby K all possible care.22 The Hospital provided that care. 3
After several weeks in intensive care, Baby K was able to breath
without assistance and was discharged to a nursing home. Within a
short time, Baby K was readmitted to the Hospital with respiratory
difficulty, during which time her mother insisted that the infant be
provided the support of a respirator.24 During her second hospital stay,
a tracheostomy' was inserted into her throat for greater ease of mechanical ventilation.26 After Baby K's second admission, the Hospital
filed for declaratory relief from being forced to treat the infant.27 During her life, Baby K resided at a nursing home and was rushed to the
Hospital six times for ventilator support, which the Hospital provided. 8 At age 30 months, after one such trip she had a cardiac arrest
and died.29

18. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1030.
21. Id. at 1025.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Tracheostomy is an opening into the trachea through the neck. STEADMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1830 (26th ed. 1995). For Baby K, this avoided repeated oral- or nasaltracheal intubations which can be damaging to the soft tissue of the mouth and prevent the
infant from bottle feeding.
26. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025-26.
27. Id. at 1026.
28. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1025.
29. Marylou Tousignant & Bill Miller, Death of 'Baby K' Leaves a Legacy of Legal
Precedents, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1995, at B3.
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Court Proceedings

The Hospital asserted that ventilation would not cure anencephaly,
and thus it was not obligated to provide this care. ° The Hospital's
decision to seek relief was not related to the financing of Baby K's
health care." Supportive of the Hospital's decision was the fact that
no other hospital in the area was willing to provide the treatment that
the mother demanded. 2 The Hospital asserted that withholding ventilator treatment from Baby K over Ms. H's objections would not violate
federal or state law. The Hospital sought relief in United States District Court in the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to the Declarato34
ry Judgment Act.
The district court denied declaratory judgment, reasoning that withholding such life-sustaining treatment would violate EMTALA, 35 the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973," and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).37 The court held that, despite the Hospital's claim, there was
no private right of action under the Child Abuse Amendments of
198438 and declined to assert jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment under the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act.39 The Hospital appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 0 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court decision that under EMTALA the Hospital
could not refuse to treat Baby K's respiratory distress when she was
presented to the Hospital in need of stabilization.41

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1026.
Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593.
Id. at 592.
Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026; See also 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988).
Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026.
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1029.
Id. at 1030.
Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593.
Id. at 592.
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C. Issues
The Fourth Circuit's decision supports mandatory emergency care
on demand. Any patient or his\her surrogate can demand, and must
receive, the most sophisticated medical care in an emergency, even if
physicians consider the treatment to be morally and ethically inappropriate.42 However, the court ignored federal legislation that specifically
addresses care of disabled newborns. 3 This legislation permits physicians to withhold the same care that the Fourth Circuit's decision mandates they provide.44
The court held that when a patient is denied emergency medical
stabilization, state law is preempted by EMTALA even if the treating
physicians consider the requested care to be medically or ethically
inappropriate.45 Prior to this decision, standards of emergency care
were governed by state malpractice law. After this decision, claims of
malpractice during emergency care may be heard under EMTALA in
federal courts.46
The court's expansion of patient rights through EMTALA creates
conflicts which go to the heart of our legal and moral framework. It
was reasonable for the Hospital to question delivery of the requested
care to Baby K because anencephaly is so hopeless. The Hospital believed that it was more important to make the decision in such an
extreme case according to the accepted medical standard of care than
to preserve autonomous decisions of patient surrogates.47 However,
according to the district court, the Hospital's decision went against the
mother's constitutionally protected right to "bring up children"48 and
her free exercise of religion.49 This conflict juxtaposes the moral prin42. Id. at 596.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101 to 5107; see also infra Part Il.C.2.
44. 42 U.S.C. 5106g(10) (1988) (stating exceptions to the definition of medical neglect
for handicapped newborns); see also infra note 70.
45. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597.
46. See infra Part V.D.
47. Candance Cummins Gauthier, PhilosophicalFoundations of Respect for Autonomy,
3 KENNEDY INST. ETracs J. 21, 35 (1993) [hereinafter Gauthier]; see also infra Part V.F.1.
48. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
49. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35; see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234
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ciple of beneficence and the professional standard of physician autonomy against basic constitutional freedoms.
The most important legal and ethical issues are: (1) whether the
Fourth Circuit's Baby K decision is wrong when EMTALA is read
pari materia with other federal statutes; (2) whether differential treatment of Baby K can be justified in an equal protection context;" and
(3) whether such end-of-life decisions are susceptible to control by the
courts,5 ' or alternatively, whether our society should ratify and enforce
the standards of medical specialty groups that deal with such quality of
life decisions.

III. BACKGROUND
A. Patient-PhysicianDecision-Making Generally
There is a strong constitutional basis for allowing parents to decide
on the medical care provided to their children. 2 However, in Virginia
and Maryland, if a patient requests care, that in the physicians judgment is non-sensical or not in the patient's best interests, the physician
is justified to refuse to provide that care and may refer the patient to
another physician who will provide that care.53
The courts have generally upheld the primacy of parental decisionmaking about medical care offered to their children. 4 Naturally, this
includes the care offered to handicapped newborns. However, this view
is not unanimous. In a Michigan case involving a severely impaired

(1972).
50. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (stating that "[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they were the
same"); see also F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
51. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 598 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
52. See infra Part IV.A.2. for the Constitutional underpinnings that support Ms. H's

decision.
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994); MD.
611 (1994).

CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN.

§ 5-

54. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979); In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796,
801 n.51 (1979) ("[it is fundamental that parental autonomy is constitutionally protected").
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infant, the court suspended parental rights after the mother refused to
withdraw respirator care from the infant.5 Subsequently, the guardian
appointed by the court decided to withdraw life-sustaining treatment
from the infant."6
Some standards of medical care are initiated by groups of medical
specialists. Though clear standards do not exist for every aspect of
medical practice, medical specialty groups have developed guidelines
for many end-of-life medical decisions.57 The American Academy of
Pediatrics, a national group dedicated to the health and welfare of
children, has fostered interdisciplinary collaboration to determine the
appropriate standard of care for anencephalias.58
B. EMTALA
Congress enacted EMTALA in 1986 as Part of the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA)59 responding
to its "concern that hospitals were 'dumping' patients [who were] unable to pay, by either refusing to provide emergency medical treatment
or transferring patients before their emergency conditions were stabilized."6 EMTALA was an attempt to provide an "adequate first re-

55. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Child Abuse by Whom?- Parental
Rights and Judicial Competency Determinations: The Baby K and the Baby Terry Cases, 20
OHio N.U. L. REv. 821, 822 (1994) [hereinafter Bopp & Coleson] (citing In re
Achtabowski, No. G93142173GD (Mich. Probate Ct. July 30, 1993)); see also John J. Paris
et al., Physician's Refiisal of Requested Treatment: The Case of Baby L, 322 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1012, 1012-15 (1990) (upholding the right of a hospital and physicians to refuse to
provide care that violated their moral and ethical principles based on Brophy v. New England Siani Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 639 (Mass. 1986)).
56. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 55, at 822.
57. See supra note 11.
58. See supra note 3.
59. Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
(final regulations were not promulgated by the Health Care Financing Administration until
recently). See 59 Fed. Reg. 32,087 (1994).
60. Brooks v. Maryland Gen. Hosp., Inc., 996 F.2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993) (defining
dumping as the transfer of a patient from one hospital to another, generally because of the
patient's indigence).
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sponse to a medical crisis" for all patients."1 EMTALA has been succinctly described as follows:
The Act applies to all hospitals participating in Medicare that provide
emergency services as well as the physicians on the hospitals' medical
staffs. The Act requires hospitals to provide an appropriate medical screening examination for any individual who presents at the hospital to determine whether the individual has an emergency medical condition. If the
individual has an emergency medical condition as defined by the Act, the
hospital must provide treatment to stabilize the condition or provide an
appropriate transfer of the individual to another facility. Hospitals and
physicians that violate the Act are subject to civil monetary penalties and
termination from the Medicare program in addition to being subject to a
private cause of action for damages suffered as a result of the violation.62

An emergency medical condition is defined as a "medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity...
such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably
be expected to result in ... serious impairment of bodily functions ... " To stabilize means "to provide such medical treatment

of the condition as may be necessary to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material deterioration of the condition is likely
to result."64
C. Other Federal Law
1.

Medicare

Emergency rooms that are governed by EMTALA are those in
hospitals that have entered into a provider agreement with Medicare. 5
Because most hospitals have entered into such provider agreements,

61.

Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 880 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting 131

CONG. REC. S13904 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1985) (statement of Sen. Durenberger)).

62. Brenda Strama & Laura Gilchrist, Patient Dumping: New Anti-Dumping Regulations Strengthen Patient Protections, 11 No. 9 HEALTHSPAN 3 (1994) (providing a compre-

hensive review of all EMTALA provisions prior to the final Baby K decision).
63, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1992); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(F)(1)
(1988).
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most emergency rooms in the U.S. are governed by EMTALA.
EMTALA requires the government to utilize the Medicare peer review
mechanisms when violations of the statute are suspected." Under
Medicare, physicians are governed by carefully constructed review

organizations for all services related to Medicare recipients and hospitals with provider agreements throughout the health care system.67 Under Medicare statutes, physicians must provide only such care as is
medically necessary and consistent with prevailing standards.68

EMTALA has no language that suspends Medicare law governing standards of care.
2.

The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984

The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 (the Amendments) set out
specific criteria for appropriate end-of-life decisions in severely impaired newborn 69
. The Amendments sought to prevent medical ne-

66. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1992).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5 (1988) (prescribing the standard of care hospitals and physicians are to follow in the Medicare program).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a) (1988) (Providing for Physician Review Organization
(PRO) review of Medicare hospitals and physicians. The secretary contracts pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1395cc to process data concerning health care services provided Medicare beneficiaries and to intervene when these data indicate that the services have been provided unnecessarily or with inadequate quality. The PRO is composed of practicing doctors, who
because of their special expertise are able to perform reviews. There is also one consumer
on the PRO. There can be no conflicts of interest between PRO members and hospitals
reviewed. The functions set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a) are to determine if services are
reasonable, medically necessary, allowable, meet professional standards, and whether the
patient needs admission to hospital.).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10) (1988) (Stating that medical neglect occurs only if "[the
health care provider] fail[s] to respond to [an] infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment . . . which, in the treating physician's . . . reasonable medical judgment, will
be most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions."). Explicitly
excluded from the definition of neglect is the failure to provide treatment, other than appropriate nutrition, hydration and medication:
when, in the treating physician's . . . reasonable medical judgment[:] (A) the infant
is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision of such treatment would:
(i) merely prolong dying; (ii) not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all the
infant's life-threatening conditions; or (iii) otherwise be futile in terms of survival
of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment would be virtually futile in
terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment itself under such circumstanc-
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glect of the infant by physicians and other health care providers. There
is no evidence that EMTALA was meant to overrule the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984.
The Amendments provide that when a physician determines that
further care of an infant is futile, the physician may reasonably withdraw care based on specific criteria.7" When such care is withdrawn,
the Amendments state that this action does not constitute medical neglect.7
The Amendments set criteria for end-of-life decisions that were a
compromise between pediatricians, parents, and right-to-life groups.72
This extraordinary consensus came from medical and personal experiences and legislative know-how.73 Although preservation of parental
autonomy was a part of this consensus, another component was the
need for reasonable decisions in the face of futility.74 Under the
Amendments:
If a handicapped newborn infant suffers from more than one life-threatening condition, for at least one of which (in the reasonable medical judgment of the attending physician) there is no corrective treatment, treatment
need not be administered for any of the conditions, correctable or not.75
Application of the clear language of the Amendments and the legislative intent permits physicians to withhold life-saving measures in anen-

es would be inhumane.
Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 444 nn.92-93 (1989) [hereinafter MEISEL] (cit-

ing 50 Fed. Reg. 14,878, 14,879 (1985))
73. Id.

74. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(b)(2) (1987) (stating that physicians would not be held to
treat a severely impaired newborn if treatment would "otherwise be futile in terms of the
survival of the infant").
75. MEISEL, supra note 72, at 452 (citing Joint Explanatory Statement by Principal
Sponsors of Compromise Amendment Regarding Services and Treatmentsfor Disabled Infants,

S. REP. No. 246, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2969,
2970).
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cephalias because the severe brain anomaly in these infants cannot be
corrected.76
3. The Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA)
The Rehabilitation Act (RA) and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) are fashioned to prevent discrimination against handicapped
individuals. The RA attempts to prevent discrimination in federally
funded programs," and the ADA in employment and in places of
public accommodation, like the hospital." Both acts are based on similar rationales and legislative histories.79 The RA was not framed to
apply to end-of-life medical decisions for handicapped newborns.8" As
well, there is no language in the ADA to this effect. Because the two
acts are similar, the following information on the RA applies also to
the ADA.
The RA provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual . .. shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance."8 ' A "handicapped individual" is defined in the RA as "any
person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a
record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment."" Under the RA, a handicapped individual "includes an
infant who is born with a congenital defect."83

76. See supra notes 69 and 75.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1988).
78. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1995).
,
79. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.D.C. 1983)
(referring to the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act); United States EEOC v. AIC
Sec. Investigation, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 (N.D. I11.
1993) (stating that the legislative history of the ADA anticipates that the ADA will be guided by the precedent of the

RA).
80. See supra note 9.

81. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1995).
82. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1995).
83. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 624 (1986).
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In 1983, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services attempted to promulgate regulations under section 504 of the
RA to prevent medical neglect to handicapped newborns. This followed
the death from starvation of Baby Doe, an infant with Down Syndrome
whose parents refused life-sustaining esophageal surgery.84 These regulations would have required notices to be placed in hospital nurseries
stating that hospitals would violate Section 504 "by declining to treat
an operable life-threatening condition in an infant . . [and by aiding]
a decision by the infant's parents or guardian to withhold treatment or
nourishment discriminatorily."85 The regulations also would have provided for emergency response teams to come to hospitals when summoned by anonymous "hot line" phone calls, to prevent medical neglect of handicapped newborns in hospitals.86
The regulations were rejected by the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York in American Hospital Association v.
Heckler." The court held that the RA did not authorize the regulations, and it enjoined their enforcement.88 The lower court decision
was summarily affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and was affirmed by a plurality of the United States

84. Id. at 617 (Stating:
ITlhe hospital initiated judicial proceedings to override the parents' decision, but an
Indiana trial court, after holding a hearing the same evening, denied the requested
relief . . . . [Ihe court asked the local Child Protection Committee to review its
decision. After conducting its own hearing, the Committee found no reason to
disagree with the court's ruling . . . .At the instance of the local prosecutor, the
Indiana courts . . .held another hearing at which the court concluded that 'Baby
Doe' had not been neglected under Indiana's Child in Need of Services statute.
Additional attempts to seek judicial intervention were rebuffed the same day. On
the following day, the Indiana Court of Appeals denied a request for an immediate
hearing. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct., Apr. 12,
1982). The Indiana Supreme Court, by a vote of 3 to 1, rejected a petition for a
writ of mandamus. State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482 S 140 (Ind. May
27, 1982). The infant died while a stay was being sought in this court, and [the
U.S. Supreme Court] subsequently denied certiorari. Infant Doe v. Bloomington
Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983).).
85. 47 Fed. Reg. 26,027 (1982).
86. 48 Fed. Reg. 9631-32 (May 7, 1983).
87. 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); summarily aff'd 794 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1984),
affid, Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
88. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. at 542.
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Supreme Court. 9 In enjoining enforcement of the regulations, the
Court acknowledged that treatment of anencephalias was not required, 9 despite the fact that the enjoined regulations would have possibly unearthed other incidents of medical neglect under the RA.
The district court had held that Heckler is directly controlled by
the Second Circuit decision in United States v. University Hospital.9'
In University Hospital, the government challenged under section 50492
the parent's decision not to treat their severely handicapped newborn,
Baby Jane Doe. When the Supreme Court affirmed Heckler, in Bowen, 93 it applied the rationale from University Hospital to explain why
Section 504 did not apply to medical decisions in handicapped newborns:
[A]lthough Baby Jane Doe was a "handicapped individual," she was not

"otherwise qualified" within the meaning of section 504 because "where
medical treatment is at issue, it is typically the handicap itself that gives
rise to, or at least contributes to the need for services"; as a result "the
'otherwise qualified' criterion of section 504 cannot be meaningfully applied to a medical treatment decision." For the same reason, the Court of
Appeals rejected the Government's argument that Baby Jane Doe had been
"subjected to discrimination" under section 504: "Where the handicapping
condition is related to the condition(s) to be treated, it will rarely, if ever,
be possible to say with certainty that a particular decision was
'discriminatory'." . . . The difficulty of applying section 504 to individual
medical treatment decisions confirmed the Court of Appeals in its view
that "[C]ongress never contemplated that section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act would apply to treatment decisions involving defective newborn infants when the statute was enacted in 1973, when it was amended in
1974, or at any subsequent time."94

89. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
90. Id. at 476 U.S. at 615 n.4 (citing 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 app. C(a)(5)(iii) (1994) (stating
that § 504 does not require treatment of anencephaly because it would "do no more than
temporarily prolong the act of dying")).
91. Heckler, 585 F. Supp. at 542 (citing United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d

144 (2d
92.
93.
94.

Cir. 1984)).
University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 147.
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 623.
Id. at 622 (citing University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156-61).
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Using the reasoning from University Hospital, the Bowen plurality
stated that "[s]ection 504 does not authorize the Secretary to give unsolicited advice either to parents, to hospitals, or to state officials who
are faced with difficult treatment decisions concerning handicapped
children."95
Both University Hospital and Bowen held that the RA does not
authorize government intervention when parents have refused the care
offered.96 The case where parents desire care but physicians wish to
withhold that care is not considered in this line of cases.
D. State Law Governing Medical Decisions
In a majority of states, parents can decide whether to accept or
refuse offered medical treatment or to seek other physicians for alternative treatments for their minor children.9 7 Parental decisions can only
be reviewed by the state under exceptional circumstances.9"
In 1983, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (the
Commission) discussed the issue of parental decision-making in handicapped newborns.99 First, the Commission observed that under state
law parents are strongly presumed to be the proper decision-makers for
these infants based on the common law and the constitutional right to
privacy. ' Second, to protect helpless infants, the state, through parens patriae power, can punish child abuse and neglect and intervene
when parental choices are harmful. However, as long as "parents

95. Id. at 647.
96. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156-61; Bowen, 476 U.S. at 624.
97. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 628 (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 14,880 (1985) (final rule implementing Child Abuse Amendments of 1984) ("[t]he decision to provide or withhold medically
indicated treatment is, except in highly unusual circumstances, made by the parents or legal
guardian")).
98. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,880 (1985).
99. PRESIDENT's COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETIcAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND BEHAVIORAL, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT, 212-14 (1983).

100. Id.
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choose from professionally accepted treatment options, the choice is
01
rarely reviewed in court and even less frequently supervened."'
According to Virginia law, "Nothing in [the Health Care Decisions
Act] shall be construed to require a physician to prescribe or render
medical treatment to a patient that the physician determines to be medically or ethically inappropriate."'0 2 If the physician's plan for treatment is contrary to the surrogate's decision, then the physician must
transfer the patient to another physician who is willing to provide the
care desired by the surrogate." 3 This physician's right is echoed in
Maryland,"'4 where a physician may "withhold or withdraw, as medically ineffective, a treatment that under generally accepted medical
practices is life-sustaining in nature,"'05 as long as another physician
agrees in writing." 6
IV. THE DECISION
A.

Majority
The court noted:
[T]he hospital [sought] declaratory and injunctive relief from providing
inappropriate care to Baby K under four federal statutes and one Virginia
statute: the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act . . . ; the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . . ; the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ...

; the Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 . . . ; and the Virginia

Medical Malpractice Act ....

107

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of the Federal District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, Alexandria Division, that, under
101. Id.
102. VA.

CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie 1992)
103. Id.
104. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 5-611(a) (1994) ("[n]othing in this subtitle may
be construed to require a physician to prescribe or render medical treatment to a patient that
the physician determines to be ethically inappropriate").
105.

MD. CODE ANN.,

HEALTH GEN. § 5-611(b)(2)(i)

(1994).

106. Id.
107. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026.
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EMTALA, the Hospital could not refuse to treat Baby K's respiratory
distress when she presented to the Hospital for stabilization."° '
Both the circuit °9 and the district court... used EMTALA as
the cornerstone of their holdings. However, the district court explicated
the constitutional and statutory bases for its decision,"' whereas the
circuit court chose not to address constitutional law, but instead dealt
only with the clear language of EMTALA."'
The Fourth Circuit held that the Hospital must treat any patient,
no matter what condition they are in, when they arrive at the emergency room and request treatment."' The court interpreted EMTALA's
definitions of "emergency medical condition"" 4 and "stabilization""' 5
of a patient literally, and as being without exception." 6
The circuit court held that the Hospital would be liable under
EMTALA if Baby K arrived at the emergency room in respiratory
distress (or with some other emergency medical condition) and the
Hospital failed to provide mechanical ventilation (or some other medical treatment) necessary to stabilize her acute condition." 7 The court
held:
The terms of EMTALA as written do not allow the Hospital to fulfill its

duty to provide stabilizing treatment by simply dispensing uniform treatment. Rather, the Hospital must provide that treatment necessary to prevent the material deterioration of each patient's emergency medical condition. In the case of Baby K, the treatment necessary to prevent the material deterioration of her condition when she is in respiratory distress includes respiratory support."'

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
ing text.
115.
ing text.

Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592.
Id.
Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1026.
Id.at 1030.
Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992); see supra note 63 and accompany42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1992); see supra note 64 and accompany-

116. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597.

117. Id., 16 F.3d at 596.
118. Id.
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The court directly refuted any exceptions to EMTALA that would
allow physicians to withhold treatment when the case is deemed hopeless." 9 The court concluded its role would not permit it to go beyond
the plain language of EMTALA."'
Additionally, the court held that the statute does not accept a
physician's judgment that care may be appropriate in one case and may
be inappropriate in another, based on an acceptable standard of care in
the profession.121 The court was unable to find any language in
EMTALA or any legislative history that would exempt physicians from
providing all care necessary to stabilize the patient.'
Even when
EMTALA forces doctors to treat patients beyond acceptable standards
of care, state and local laws that directly conflict with the requirements
of EMTALA are preempted.'23
1. Other Sltatutes Addressed by the Baby K courts
The Fourth Circuit dealt perfunctorily with the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act. The court
noted:
In addressing these provisions, the district court concluded that a failure to

provide respiratory support to Baby K because of her condition of anencephaly would constitute discrimination in violation of the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act but declined to rule on the application of the Child
Abuse Act or Virginia law. Because we conclude that the Hospital has a
duty to render stabilizing treatment under EMTALA, we need not address
its 4obligations under the remaining federal statutes or the laws of Virgin2
ia.1

119. Id.

120.
121.
122.
patients,
123.
124.

Id. See also Baber, 977 F.2d at 878.
Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.
Id. See also Baber, 977 F.2d at 880. (Holding that the hospital must stabilize all
not just indigents. This issue was not addressed in Baby K).
Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (Supp. IV 1992).
Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592 n.2.
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Although the Fourth Circuit did not address federal and state laws,
the district court discussed these laws in detail. Therefore, the district
court's reasoning on these applicable laws will be discussed throughout
this Comment.
The Fourth Circuit did not apply the Child Abuse Amendments of
1984.2"5 These Amendments set specific standards to guide physicians
in end-of-life decisions for severely impaired infants. 26 However, the
Fourth Circuit did affirm the decision of the district court, which held
that the Amendments were not applicable to this case because Virginia
Child Protective Services was not a party to the case.127 The district
court held that the Amendments only apply to states which receive
federal grants for child abuse and neglect programs. The Amendments
authorize the states to bring legal action through their child protective
service agencies to prevent the medical neglect of disabled infants."'
Additionally, although the district court held that "the Hospital's
desire to withhold ventilator treatment from Baby K over her mother's
objections would violate the Rehabilitation Act," '29 the circuit court
only addressed EMTALA. 3 ° The district court had reasoned that the
Hospital was governed by the Rehabilitation Act because it was a
and Baby K was a "handicapped individual"
Medicare provider,'
under the Rehabilitation Act. 32 Therefore, the district court held that
Baby K "has statutory rights not to be discriminated against on the
' It further held that Baby K was qualified to
basis of her handicap."133
receive ventilator treatment and ventilator treatment was being threat-

125. Id.
126. 42 U.S.C. §5106g(10) (1988); see also supra note 69.
127. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029.

128. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10)(C) (1988).
129. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1028.
130. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592.
131. See United States v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 736 F.2d 1039, 1049 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
132. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 624.
133. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1028.
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ened with denial because of an unjustified consideration of her anence3
phalic handicap. 1
Similarly, the circuit court did not address the district court's holding1 35 that "the hospital would . . . violate the Americans with Disabilities Act if it were to withhold ventilator treatment from Baby
K.' 36 Baby K had a "disability"' 37 and was cared for in a hospital,
which is a place of "public accommodation.' 3' The district court
ruled that the Hospital would violate the ADA because the law states:
[I]t shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of individuals
on the basis of a disability . . . to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity.'39
Finally, the Fourth Circuit chose not to discuss Virginia laws because it held that the Hospital has the duty to render stabilizing treatment under EMTALA 40 The district court held that Virginia statutes
and case law played no role in its Baby K decision. 41 The Hospital
requested the district court to declare that refusing ventilatory care to
Baby K was not malpractice 42 within the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act. 14 The district court "refused to elbow its way into Virginia
medical malpractice standards.', 144 It claimed that neither the Virginia
court nor the appointed Virginia Review Panel for Standards of Medi-

134. Id. at 1027.
135. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592.

136. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1028-29.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1993) (explaining that a disability includes
any "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual"); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (defining "physical or mental
impairment').
138. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (Supp. V 1993); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1995).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
140. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592 n.2.
141. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029.
142. Id.
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Michie 1992).
144. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030.
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cal Care had dealt with anencephaly, so Virginia laws should play no
145
role in the decision.
2. Constitutional Underpinnings that Support Ms. H's Decision
The Fourth Circuit did not elaborate on the constitutional support
for Ms. H's decision. Instead, it only addressed the letter of
EMTALA.' 4' However, the Fourth Circuit did affirm the district
court's decision, which offered several constitutional bases for its ruling in favor of Ms. H. These bases include: (1) the standing that par47
ents have to assert the constitutional rights of their minor children;
(2) the "right to 'bring up children' grounded in the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause;' ' 48 (3) the "primary role" in the
"nurture and upbringing of their children;' ' 49 (4) the "plenary authority parents have to seek medical care for their children, even when the
decision might impinge on a liberty interest of the child;"'5 ° (5) the
"free exercise of religion, protected by the First Amendment;"'51 (6)
the "need for a clear and compelling governmental interest [to] justify
a statute that interferes with the person's religious convictions;' ' 5 2 (7)
the "presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their
child" because the "natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the
best interests of their children;"'53 and (8) the explicit guarantees of a

145. Id. at 1029.
146. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.
147. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1031 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 n.6
(1972)).
148. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35).
149. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
150. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-604
(1979)).
151. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-535; Yoder, 406
U.S. at 234).
152. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030 (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 n.1 (1990) (superseded by statute); Yoder, 406
U.S. at 233).
153. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030 (quoting Parham, 442 U.S. at 602).
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right to life in the United States Constitution, Amendments V and
XIV, and the Virginia Constitution, Article 1, Sections i and ii.
B. Dissent
Senior Circuit Judge Sprouse dissented to the majority opinion
based on three issues.'54 First, EMTALA was designed as an antidumping statute. Nothing in the legislative history or in the act itself
conceived of a case that judged physician end-of-life decisions.'"
Second, anencephaly was the relevant condition, not respiratory compromise.' s6 Even though such an infant may suffer recurrent emergencies, EMTALA was not intended to deal with repeated emergencies in
a terminal infant.' 57 Baby K's anencephaly was her relevant condition, and the Hospital should not have to respond to her case as a
series of discrete emergencies.' Finally, end-of-life decisions of this
type do not lend themselves to legal oversight. According to Judge
Sprouse, if the court required this oversight, it should be on a case-bycase basis under state malpractice law.'
V.

ANALYSIS

The Baby K decision is adverse to the long standing principle of
physician autonomy in decision-making. 6 ° The following analysis will
explain how the decision establishes the principle of "mandatory emergency medical care on demand"' 6 ' for all patients and how that principle replaces standards of care established by the medical profession."" This Part of the Comment will describe how the Fourth Circuit superseded, circumvented'63 or preempted applicable federal and
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Baby K, 16 F.3d at 598 (Sprouse, J., Dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part III.A.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
See infra Part V.C.
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state laws'" in establishing this principle. Likewise, it will explain
how the court ignored basic constitutional conflicts165 and avoided
ethical conflicts inherent in its decision. 66 Finally, this Part of the
Comment will propose that medical specialty groups should provide
Congress with consensus guidelines for these sensitive cases, 167 and
that Congress should amend EMTALA to support stabilization with
68
medically appropriate care in accordance with these guidelines.
A.

Mandatory Emergency Care on Demand

The Fourth Circuit held unequivocally that the Hospital had a duty
to stabilize a patient in an emergent situation under EMTALA. 169 The
Hospital argued:
(1) [T]hat this court has previously interpreted EMTALA as only requiring
uniform treatment of all patients exhibiting the same condition; (2) that in
prohibiting disparate emergency medical treatment Congress did not intend
to require physicians to provide treatment outside the prevailing standard
of medical care; (3) that an interpretation of EMTALA that requires a
hospital or physician to provide respiratory support to an anencephalic
infant fails to recognize a physician's ability, under Virginia law, to refuse
to provide medical treatment that the physician considers medically or
ethically inappropriate; and (4) that EMTALA only applies to patients who
are transferred from a hospital in an unstable condition.'

The court repudiated each argument raised by the Hospital, holding
that the issues of futility and prevailing standards of care were overridden by the need for stabilization of the patient's vital signs. 7 ' In effect, any patient with any combination of life-threatening ailments can
demand stabilization.'

164. See infra Part V.D.
165. See infra Part V.E.
166. See infra Part V.F.

167. See infra Part V.G.1.
168. See infra Part V.G.2.
169. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.

170. Id. at 595.
171. Id.at 592.
172. See 42 C.F.R. § 489.24 (1995).
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Under these holdings, the surrogate decision-maker for a victim of
an imminently fatal, close-range, shotgun blast to the brain could demand that the patient receive ventilatory support for stabilization. After
Baby K, even if all that remained of a patient's brain is a brainstem,
the surrogate can rightfully demand mechanical ventilation."
The
court held that the doctors must provide this treatment despite the fact
that the appropriate standard of care is to give comfort measures on4

ly.17

The court held that the Hospital cannot avoid EMTALA by claiming that it is providing the same care to all anencephalias' 75 or other
76
classes of patients. The Hospital can provide the same screening,
but not the same treatment if that treatment is to withhold mechanical
ventilation. The Hospital can use the same procedures to determine the
extent of respiratory compromise, but the duty to stabilize that respiratory condition is governed by EMTALA, not the "usual standard of
care" for the class of patients having anencephaly. 77 Even if the
court allowed uniform treatment of medical conditions, it held that
Baby K's emergent conditions were bradypnea and apnea,17 ' not anencephaly1 79 In the case of the unfortunate shotgun victim, the physicians would have to base their treatment plan on the fact that the victim has breathing difficulty. Physicians are trained and encouraged to
view the entire patient before embarking on a treatment decision. 80
In his dissent to the Fourth Circuit decision in Baby K, Judge Sprouse
was in accord with this teaching: "I would consider anencephaly as the
relevant condition and the respiratory difficulty as one of many subsid-

173. See Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.

174. Id.
Id.
See Baber, 977 F.2d at 881; Brooks, 996 F.2d at 710-11.
Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.
Bradypnea is an "abnormal slowness of breathing." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DIcTIoNARY 230 (27th ed. 1988). In an infant who has established and sustained spontaneous breathing, apnea describes the cessation of respiration for more than 60 seconds. Id.
at 112.
179. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596 n.9.
180. John M. Freeman, Ethical Aspects of Management of Infants with Severe Handicaps, in PEDIATRIcs 14-15 (Abraham M. Rudolph ed., 1977).
175.
176.
177.
178.
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iary conditions found in a patient with18the disease. EMTALA was not
designed to reach such circumstances." '
The court ruled that the "plain language" of EMTALA dictated
that Baby K (and any other patient) receive all care requested for stabilization.'
However, EMTALA's language is unrealistic because it
separates the patient's emergency event from the entire context of the
patient's illness. The statute's language, as interpreted by the Fourth
Circuit may sometimes force physicians to act against their moral,
ethical and professional standards.
B.

Beyond "Appropriateness" of Medical Care

Consensus standards of care in medicine are determined by medical groups representing large numbers of physicians with experience in
the medical conditions in question. These standards exist for the care
of anencephalic infants.'83 This kind of consensus on the care of specific types of terminally ill patients is rare,'84 and it is reached with
difficulty. Sub-specialty medical groups continue to actively analyze
outcomes of technical interventions in terminally ill patients 8 ' in order to clarify interventions that may be futile for these patients. Today,
though consensus does exist with respect to the appropriate standards
of care for anencephalias, the Fourth Circuit's rigid interpretation of
EMTALA ignores these standards altogether.
The Fourth Circuit construed EMTALA to require a level of care
that was outside the prevailing standard of care. The district court
based this same holding on the fear that if an exception were made for
the class of patients with anencephaly, then physicians would feel free
to withhold treatment from many other classes of patients.'86 The

181. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 599.
182. Id.
183. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 590; see also supra note 3.
184. See supra note 11.
185. Kathy Faber-Langendoen, Resuscitation of Patients with Metastatic Cancer: Is
Transient Benefit Still Futile?, 151 ARc¢nVEs INTERNAL MED. 235 (1991) [hereinafter FaberLangendoen].
186. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1027.
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Fourth Circuit
justified its holding solely on the plain language of
87
EMTALA. 1
The Sixth Circuit has interpreted EMTALA to not only protect
indigents from emergency room "dumping," but also to prevent selective non-treatment of handicapped individuals against whom some physicians may discriminate.'88 Dumping can occur when the hospital has
a "distaste for a patient's condition."'89 To prevent such arbitrary discrimination, physicians must decide to withhold stabilization in an
emergency only according to clear cut standards of care. These stan9
dards exist for anencephalias."'
C. Superseding or Circumventing other Federal Law
The Baby K decision is not consistent with Medicare law that
governs the standards of health care for Medicare patients. 9 ' Furthermore, the decision does not take into account the clear intention of the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, which explicitly address withholding care from terminally ill newborns. 92 Finally, the decision ignores
the RA and the ADA, both of which have specific provisions allowing
physicians latitude in decision-making.' 93

187. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.
188. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir. 1990).

189. Id.
190. See supra note 3.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5 (1988) (prescribing the standard of care that hospitals and
physicians are to follow in the Medicare program).
192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101 to 5107 (1988).
193. SENATE COMM. ON LAB. AND HUMAN RESOURCES, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABLmEs ACT OF 1989, S. Rep. No. 101-116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1989), reprintedin
1 BERNARD D. REAMS, JR. Er AL., DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: A LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 (1992) (stating that
nothing in this legislation is intended to prohibit a physician from providing the most appropriate treatment in the physicians judgment); see also AAP v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395,
401 (D.D.C. 1983); United States v. University Hosp. 729 F.2d 144, 158 (2nd Cir. 1984).
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1. Medicare Law
EMTALA is intimately entwined in Medicare law, 194 yet the
Fourth Circuit does not interpret EMTALA consistently with the Medicare statutes. EMTALA requires the government to utilize the standard
peer review mechanisms 95 when violations of the statute are suspected:
In considering allegations of violations of the requirements of this section
in imposing sanctions [civil penalties] under paragraph (1), the Secretary
shall request the appropriate utilization and quality control peer review
organization ... to assess whether the individual involved had an
emergency medical condition which had not been stabilized, and provide a
report on its findings.' 96
Medicare uses peer review standards to govern appropriateness of care
throughout the health care system.' 97 The circuit court does not discuss EMTALA's relation to Medicare law, but the district court discounts this mechanism of setting standards in an emergency situation.'98
The district court held that if hospitals and physicians follow established standards of care for certain end-of-life decisions, they would
violate their statutory obligation under EMTALA.'99 However, there
is no language in EMTALA which suspends Medicare law governing
standards of care. Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1320c-5 and other Medicare statutes, physicians must provide only such care as is medically
necessary and consistent with prevailing standards." 0 Physicians are
governed by Medicare's carefully constructed review organizations for
all other services. Thus, the Baby K opinion forces physicians to be di-

194.
195.
196.
197.
cians are
198.
199.

See supra Part III.C.1.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(3) (Supp. 11 1990).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5 (1988) (prescribing the standard of care hospitals and physito follow in the Medicare program).
Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1027.
Baby K, 16 F.3d at 596.

200. See supra note 68.
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rected solely by patient or surrogate demands and the limits of technologic possibility, not by existing Medicare law.
The determinants of appropriate standards of health care codified
in the Medicare statutes should govern the stabilization requirements in
EMTALA. Appropriate standards, as determined by trained physicians,
should control care given in emergency rooms. The use of the term
"appropriate" in the statute should provide latitude for physicians to
withhold life-saving stabilization when consensus standards agree.
Those consensus standards are the standards of the profession, and,
with respect to anencephaly, the standards exclude mechanical ventilation. By replacing these professional standards with EMTALA, the
Fourth Circuit ignores the entire foundation of professional governance
under Medicare.
2. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984
The Child Abuse Amendments of 1984 (the Amendments) set out
specific criteria for appropriate end-of-life decisions in severely impaired newborns."' In Baby K, the Fourth Circuit avoids this statute
entirely.0 2 The district court discounts this important statute because
Virginia Child Protective Services (CPS) were not a party to the case.
Even though the Amendments are procedurally inapplicable to this
case," 3 failure to provide life-prolonging treatment to Baby K would
not constitute medical neglect under the explicit provisions of the
Amendments. In this case: (1) Baby K was chronically and irreversibly
comatose; (2) treatment would merely prolong her death; (3) treatment
did not and could not correct or ameliorate all of her life threatening

201. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(1O) (1988); see also note 69.
202. See supra Part IV.A.1.
203. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029 ("[t]his request for relief must be denied because
the Hospital has failed to join a necessary party-the Virginia Child Protective Services").
See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1988). See also 42
U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(10)(C)) (1988); 45 C.F.R. § 1340.15(c)(2)(iii) (1995) (authorizing states
which receive federal grants for child abuse and neglect programs to bring legal action
through their child protective services agencies to prevent the medical neglect of disabled
infants).
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conditions; and (4) treatment was otherwise futile in terms of her survival and, therefore, inhumane.
The district judge suggested that to apply this statute to Baby K,
CPS needed to join with the Hospital in claiming that the baby was
being abused by the mother's request for ventilatory support.0 4 A
state child abuse agency has never charged a mother with neglect for
insisting on life-saving treatment for her infant. In fact, the Amendments did not even consider this possibility. Instead, the Amendments
sought to prevent medical neglect of the infant by physicians and parents.
The court ignored the consensus that was reached in the passage
of the Amendments. The Amendments provide that when a physician
determines that further care of an infant is futile, the physician may
reasonably
withdrawmedical
care."' neglect."
When such
care is withdrawn, this action
6
does not constitute
The Fourth Circuit ignored the contribution that the Amendments
can make to a reasonable interpretation of EMTALA. The Amendments
came from a labor-intensive compromise between pediatricians, parents,
and right-to-life groups." 7 The Amendments were constructed to carefully deal with hopeless cases, trying to do the right thing for the
unfortunate infant. It would be reasonable for other circuits to uphold
the Amendments when interpreting EMTALA. There is no evidence
that EMTALA was meant to overrule the Amendments. In Baby K, the
Fourth Circuit did not address the Amendments because it could not
square its holdings on EMTALA with the "plain language" of the
Amendments. In failing to address the Amendments, the Fourth Circuit
effectively stripped physicians of the flexibility to appropriately withhold life-saving measures from anencephalias based on established
medical standards of care.

204.
205.
206.
207.

Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029.
42 U.S.C. § 5106g(1O) (1988); see also supra note 69.
42 U.S.C. § 5106g(10) (1988).
MEISEL, supra note 72, at 444.
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3. The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
Neither the Rehabilitation Act (RA) nor the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) comports with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
EMTALA. The Fourth Circuit ignores the RA to avoid the standard of
care issue."'- The court explained that:
[T]he district court concluded that a failure to provide respiratory support
to Baby K because of her condition of anencephaly would constitute discrimination in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 09
But the court failed to mention either the ADA or the RA again in its
decision. The Fourth Circuit tacitly approved of the district court's
holdings about both of these acts without squarely addressing the issue.
a. The Rehabilitation Act
Even though Baby K was handicapped and disabled under the
using the Act to apply EMTALA's plain language to Baby K
is not warranted. The district court believed that the Hospital wanted to
avoid using a ventilator for Baby K because of an unjustified consideration of her anencephalic handicap.2 ' The court assumed that any
withholding of ventilator treatment would be unjustified in the context
of a handicapped and disabled baby. But the court did not consider the
Amendments in this assumption.2" 2 Furthermore, the court did not
consider the legislative history of the RA. In contrast, another district
court has recognized that "no congressional committee or member of
the House or Senate ever even suggested that [the RA] would be used
to monitor treatments of newborn infants or establish standards for
213
preserving a particular quality of life.
RA,210

208.
209.
210.
211.

Baby K, 16 F.3d at 592 n.2.
Id
See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 624.
Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1027.

212. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
213. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.D.C.
1983).
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Further, in United States v. University Hospital, the Second Circuit
noted that "at no point did any witness even remotely suggest that [the
RA] could or would be applied to treatment decisions involving defective newborns."214 In University Hospital, the parents of Baby Jane
Doe, a severely impaired newborn, wanted to withdraw treatment from
the infant but they were thwarted by a petition invoking Section 504
from an outside party. The Second Circuit found no basis for impeding
the parents' wishes.215 In Baby K, the district court tried to distinguish University Hospital by the arguing that the parents in University
Hospital consented to the withholding of treatment from Baby Jane
Doe, whereas Ms. H did not consent to the withholding of treatment
from Baby K.2 6 Although the cases are distinguishable on this issue,
the root issue is whether anyone should withhold treatment based on
the baby's extremely poor prognosis. In University Hospital, the Second Circuit answered this affirmatively.2 17
In University Hospital, the court also held that "[the RA] prohibits
discrimination against a handicapped individual only where the
individual's handicap is unrelated to, and thus improper to consideration of, the services in question. ' 211 Physicians who would withhold
ventilator therapy from Baby K are not discriminating against the baby
under the RA because her handicap was related to the services appropriately provided.219
The RA does not serve as a basis for federal intervention in medical decision-making for impaired newborns. 20 The physicians should
be able to determine the appropriate end-of-life care for Baby K because she unfortunately meets the criteria for appropriate withdrawal of
care under the Amendments. 22 1 The Baby K court was misguided in

214. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 159.
215. United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984).
216. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1028.
217. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156-57.
218. Id. at 156; see also Johnson by Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1493-94
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1255 (1993).
219. University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 156-57; see also supra note 95 (quoting Bowen, 476
U.S. at 622).
220. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 69.
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steadfastly clinging to the plain language of EMTALA, and, thereby,
superseded the obvious intent of the RA.
b. The ADA
The ADA was also not meant to serve as a basis for federal intervention in medical decision-making. It prohibits discrimination against
disabled individuals in employment and by public accommodations.222
Baby K was disabled.223 The Fourth Circuit did not reach the question of disability discrimination under the ADA. Again, however, it did
affirm the decision of the district court which held:
The Hospital's reasoning would lead to the denial of medical services to

anencephalic babies as a class of disabled individuals. Such discrimination
against a vulnerable population class is exactly what the American with
Disabilities Act was enacted to prohibit. The Hospital would therefore violate the ADA if it were to withhold ventilator treatment from Baby K.224
The legislative history of the ADA makes it clear that the Act was
not intended to prevent physicians from using their judgment and
choosing the most appropriate care for patients.2 5 Also, decisions
based on Section 504 of the RA guide interpretations of the ADA.226
The Supreme Court held in Bowen2 . that the RA was not applicable
to decisions that parents and doctors made together to withhold treatment from another severely handicapped infant. The Fourth Circuit
should have looked to Bowen for guidance when it considered the
practicality of EMTALA's plain language, but Bowen is not even mentioned by the court. The Fourth Circuit ignored the ADA to avoid the
conflict between it and EMTALA with respect to appropriate standards
of medical care.

222.
modation
223.
(defining
224.

42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (Supp. V 1993) (stating that the Hospital is a public accomunder the ADA).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. II 1990); see also 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1995)
"physical or mental impairment").
Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029.

225. See supra note 193.
226. AIC Sec. Investigation, Ltd., 820 F. Supp. at 1064.

227. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 624.
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D. Preempting State Law on Appropriateness of Care
The Fourth Circuit held that EMTALA preempts state law that
governs standards of medical care.228 The provisions of state law permitting a physician to act according to an appropriate standard of care
conflict with EMTALA's mandate for stabilization in the emergency
setting. EMTALA preempts any state law that conflicts with its requirements.229 This shift of medical practice from state to federal control is a drastic departure from the usual standard that governs medical
tort claims. It may provide an alternative to state tort actions, while it
confuses the state courts and lower federal courts about the appropriate
tort law to apply in a given case.230
1. The Conflict Between State Law and the Fourth Circuit's
Interpretation of EMTALA
Virginia law limits a patient's medical decision by establishing a
physician's obligation to make reasonable medical decisions. 1 Under
Virginia law, physicians are not required to provide treatment that they
believe is medically or ethically inappropriate. 2 When physicians
cannot agree with a patient or surrogate plan, the physician must then
transfer the patient to another physician. 3 Baby K, however, could
not be transferred to another physician or facility, because in accord
with the professional standard of care, no hospital or physician would
provide the treatment that Ms. H wanted for Baby K.234
Under Virginia medical practice law, the Hospital could reasonably
withhold ventilator therapy from Baby K.235 In fact, Ms. H had
forced Baby K's doctor to practice medicine contrary to Virginia
228. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (Supp. 11 1990) (stating that "[tihe provisions of this section do not preempt any State or local law requirement, except to the extent that the re-

quirement directly conflicts with a requirement of this section").
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See infra Part V.D.3.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994).
Id.
Id.
Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593.
See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994).
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law 6 by usurping his professional judgment. Nonetheless, the Fourth
Circuit ignored this framework of state law and imposed EMTALA.
The effects of this preemption of state law by the Fourth Circuit
are destructive to carefully defined medical practice law. EMTALA's
duty to provide stabilizing treatment applies not only to participating
hospitals but also to treating physicians in participating hospitals.237
The court does not provide an exception to EMTALA for stabilizing
treatment that physicians may deem medically or ethically inappropriate.238 The circuit court noted that "[i]t is well settled that state action must give way to federal legislation where a valid act of Congress, fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the
state." 9 Since Virginia Code Section 54.1-2990 exempts physicians
from providing care they consider medically or ethically inappropriate,
the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of EMTALA directly conflicts with
the statute.
2. Determination of the Standard of Care
State malpractice law determines the duty of care required in a
medical encounter, especially with respect to the terminally ill.240 In
an earlier case, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that questions as to
proper treatment are questions best resolved under existing state negligence law.24' Judge Sprouse echoed this belief in his dissent in Baby
K by explaining that only state malpractice law should be used to test
appropriateness of medical care.242
The Fourth Circuit failed to address the conflict between state
medical practice standards and EMTALA. The standard of care for
medical malpractice is established by the professionals who deal with

236. Id. (explaining that the practice of medicine is "prevention, diagnosis and treatment
of physical or mental ailments, conditions, diseases, pain or infirmities by any means or
method").
237. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1990).
238. 16 F.3d at 597.
239. Id. (citing Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
240. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994).
241. Baber, 977 F.2d at 880.
242. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 599 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
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patients' problems daily. In anencephaly, the standard of care is to
provide comfort only and not to engage in life-sustaining treatment
such as mechanical ventilation.243 By remaining silent on such a crucial issue, the circuit court ignored an enormous conflict of laws that
will shift numerous emergency room plaintiffs into federal court. 2"
The district court provided a curious spin to this conflict of laws.
The district court claimed that the Virginia courts and legislature need
to validate the national standard for anencephalic infants:
Virginia courts have not addressed the question of the appropriate standard
of care for anencephalic infants and whether an exception to the general
standard of care applies to them. Besides the Malpractice Act's general
rule, Virginia's legislature has also been silent on the issue.245

This type of validation is not done with respect to most areas of
medical practice that have profound implications. For example, physicians decide, rather than legislatures or the courts, which aged patients
should receive hip replacements or coronary artery bypass procedures.
Society should not expect the courts and the legislatures to make specific decisions in areas of medicine where clinicians routinely decide
on the care that impacts longevity and quality of life.246 The district
court held that Virginia courts had not addressed the exceptions to the
general standard of care for anencephalias." 7 But the court ignores
the fact that such a standard or exception is rarely delineated by the
courts. These standards are defined by medical specialty groups,248
and they are enacted daily by physicians with their patients.
After essentially invalidating state control of medical standards, the
district court then boldly invoked Erie249 and the inherent power of

243. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 590; see also supra note 3.
244. See infra Part V.D.3.
245. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029.
246. Miles, supra note 11, at 514.
247. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029.
248. See supra notes 3 and 11.
249. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1029 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
(espousing the interest in having states decide questions of state law)).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1995

37

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 98, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 15

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:397

state law by implying that the state review panel25 should have evaluated and resolved this issue. The court stated:
Because of the significant state interests manifested by this review process
as well as the Commonwealth's interest in resolving this contentious and
unsettled social issue for itself, this court declines to "elbow its way" into

Virginia medical malpractice standards."'

Through its decision, the district court does "elbow in." Although the
determination of the standard of medical care in Virginia involves a
review panel, such a panel is not required for declaratory relief requests.252 This task is naturally left to the courts.
By not discussing the conflict between EMTALA and state medical practice law, the Fourth Circuit left the district courts questioning
how they should protect and administer existing medical standards,
especially as these standards impact the treatment of patients in the
emergency room." 3 The overlap of state and federal standards for
medical malpractice in emergency rooms is already confused. 4 The
Fourth Circuit's Baby K decision can only encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to seek a federal forum in such cases.
3. EMTALA as an Alternative to State Malpractice Actions
The clear intent of EMTALA, to prevent dumping, has been realized in cases like Huckaby v. East Alabama Medical Center.255 In

250. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995).

251. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1030.
252. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1995).

253. See infra Part V.D.3.
254.

Id.

255. 830 F. Supp. 1399 (M.D. Ala. 1993); see also Stevison v. Enid Health Systems,
Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 713-14 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the hospital could be held liable
under EMTALA when it did not provide adequate screening for stomach pains which signalled a ruptured appendix that occurred the next day); Thompson v. St. Anne's Hosp., 716
F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding a hospital liable under EMTALA for rejecting
woman with 17 week pregnancy and bleeding); Burditt v. U.S. Dep't H.H.S., 934 F.2d 1362
(5th Cir. 1991) (finding that under EMTALA, a physician had not adequately stabilized a
patient with high blood pressure in labor when he sent her away from the emergency room
170 miles to another hospital).
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Huckaby, the hospital transferred an unstable patient from the emergency room to another hospital after failing to obtain available neurosurgical help." 6 However, in many other cases EMTALA has become an
alternative emergency room medical malpractice action, creating a
strange cross of federal law and state law.
In Power v. Arlington Hospital Association,"' a decision that
mixed state and federal law, the Fourth Circuit held that: (1) proof of
bad motive or nonmedical reason was not required to establish a disparate treatment claim under EMTALA;" 8 (2) a valid screening claim
was a "malpractice claim" subject to Virginia's medical malpractice
damages cap;259 (3) Virginia's liability limit for tax-exempt hospitals
26 and (4) Virginia's procedural requirements for malpractice
applied;
claims did not apply.261 Similarly, in Delaney v. Cade,26 the Tenth
Circuit held that a genuine issue of material fact existed for continuation of a malpractice action related to EMTALA's provisions.
Furthermore, some federal district courts have allowed malpractice
actions typically handled in state court. This erroneously federalizes
such state claims. In Kaufman v. Cserny,263 the court held that there
were triable issues of fact as to whether the hospital violated the standard of care in its stabilization of the patient. In Moore v. John F.
26 4 and in Helton v. Phelps County ReKennedy Memorial Hospital
265
gional Medical Center, different federal district courts permitted
standard malpractice actions under EMTALA, for physicians' acts during stabilization in an emergency room.
In other district court cases it has become clear that EMTALA
preempts a variety of state laws governing medical malpractice. The
district court in Kansas held that the state comparative fault law did
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id.
42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 858 (emphasis added).
Id. at 861 (emphasis added).
Id. at 864 (emphasis added).
Id. at 866 (emphasis added).
986 F.2d 387, 392 (10th Cir. 1993).
856 F. Supp. 1307 (S.D. 111. 1994).
No. CIV.A.93-3428, 1994 WL 2531 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 1994).
817 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Mo. 1993).
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not apply, but damage limitations did apply,2 66 and in a separate case
the same court found that the applicable statute of limitations is federal
rather than state.267 A Florida district court held that a patient was
not required to comply with Florida presuit procedural requirements for
medical malpractice actions, to maintain a suit under EMTALA. 6 A
Missouri district court held that Missouri law purporting to provide
sovereign immunity to a hospital was preempted. 6 9 Finally, an Alabama district court held that the pleading necessary for a state medical
malpractice action was totally different from, and irrelevant to, a cause
of action based upon a violation of EMTALA
Even though a number of decisions prohibit private malpractice
causes of action against physicians based on EMTALA,27' the stage is
set to shift emergency room malpractice actions against institutions to
the federal courts through EMTALA. The Baby K decision tells plaintiffs with claims against physicians in the emergency room that the
door to federal court is open, despite the fact that the physician acted
according to accepted professional standards of medical care. As long

266. Griffith v. Mount Carmel Medical Ctr., 842 F. Supp. 1359, 1365 (D. Kan. 1994).
267. Brewer v. Miami County Hosp., 862 F. Supp. 305 (D. Kan. 1994).
268. Cooper v. Gulf Breeze Hosp., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 1538, 1543 (N.D. Fla. 1993).
269. Helton v. Phelps County Regional Medical Ctr., 817 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Mo.
1993).
270. Holcomb v. Monahan, 807 F. Supp. 1526, 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (comparing Alabama Code § 6-5-551 (1975), which applies to claims against health care providers based
upon a breach of the standards of care, with 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (EMTALA), which is
based upon liability for violation of statutory requirements).
271. Baber, 977 F.2d at 877 (stating that Congress intentionally limited patients to suits
against hospitals). Compare similar holdings in Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp.,
933 F.2d 1037, 1040 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Helton, 817 F. Supp. at 790; Reynolds v. Mercy
Hosp., 861 F. Supp. 214, 220 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); Kaufman v. Csemy, 856 F. Supp. 1307,
1311 (S.D. I11. 1994); Jones v. Wake County Hosp. Sys., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 538, 545
(E.D.N.C. 1991); and Lavignette v. West Jefferson Medical Ctr., No. CIV.A.89-5495, 1990
WL 178708 (E.D. La. Nov. 7, 1990) with Sorrells v. Babcock, 733 F. Supp. 1189, 1194
(N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that federal court has jurisdiction in COBRA suits against emergency room physicians who are alleged to have violated COBRA's provisions with civil monetary penalties against a physician for knowingly violating COBRA's provisions). See also 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1990); Moore v. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp., No.
CIV.A.93-3428, 1994 WL 2531 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 1994) (taking supplemental jurisdiction in
medical malpractice claim against physician under EMTALA).
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as a plaintiff can claim that he was inadequately screened or stabilized,
then an action can commence in a federal court.
E. Constitutional Conflicts
The Fourth Circuit did not mention the United States Constitution
in its decision. Although, the district court supported Ms. H's right to
demand and receive life-sustaining care for Baby K based on constitutional grounds,272 the circuit court chose not to address this important
aspect of the case.
The constitutional arguments affimned by the district court are the
backbone of support for parental rights in American constitutional
law.273 The Equal Protection Clause demands only that all persons
who are similarly situated be treated alike, and that differential treatment be based upon legitimate criteria.274 The medical standard of
care for anencephalias throughout the world is comfort care only,'
and such criteria is legitimate.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has sanctioned variations in autonomy-based rights of children and incompetents. 76 In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Supreme Court embraced a
modified right to life277 for permanently unconscious persons. The
court based this modification on the patient's quality of life. 7 ' In

272. See supra Part IV.A.2. (discussing constitutional underpinnings that support Ms.
H's decision).
273. See supra Part IV.A.2.
274. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (citing Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940) (stating
that the Constitution does not require things which are different in fact to be treated in law
as though they were the same); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Human Rights and Human Life: An
Uneven Fit, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1527, 1556 n.148 (1994) [hereinafter Patterson] (citing F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920))).
275. See supra note 3.
276. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-37 (1979); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 637-39 (1968).
277. 497 U.S. 261 (1990); See also, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
278. Patterson, supra note 274, at 1558 n.159 (Discussing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 274, the
court stated:
The opinion contains an extended discussion of state court cases holding that the
state has a lessened interest in preservation of life when a patient's condition is
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Cruzan, Justice Stevens argued that the sanctity of human life arises
from human characteristics that transcend physiology and embrace the
human spirit and the history and interests of each individual." 9 When
human existence is reduced to the mere biological persistence of bodily
functions, with no consciousness and no possibility of recovery, "there
is serious question as to whether the mere persistence of their bodies is
'life' as that word is commonly understood, or as it is used in both the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence."" 0
Nonetheless, the district court in Baby K supported its holding

with a standard right-to-life argument, and the Fourth Circuit implicitly
adopted this view by affirming the lower court's holding. The district
court stated that choosing to continue care is not harmful or abusive
" ' However, those in
and therefore cannot be wrong.28
favor of withholding ventilator support from Baby K did not argue that ongoing
treatment was harmful or abusive. They believed that keeping such an
'
infant alive was "futile."282
It appears that the ongoing treatment for
this infant had no purpose except to appease the infant's mother and to
avoid the imagined, diabolic, slippery slope of end-of-life decisions.

dire and that withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment could even be in the best
interest of such a patient, without any suggestion that this analysis was constitutionally impermissible. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271-74. The Cruzan decision itself
allows states to determine the conditions under which a third party may direct that
life-sustaining treatment be withdrawn from a permanently unconscious patient.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281-83. This would seem to distinguish these persons from
other incompetent patients, whose constitutional right to life would be violated by a
state law allowing third parties to withdraw treatment necessary to continuation of
life. Indeed, the treatment of permanently unconscious persons' interest in life is
quite similar to that of fetuses, although one is regarded as a person and the other
is not).
279. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 345-47.
280. Patterson, supra note 274, at 1561 n.164 (discussing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 345
(1990)); accordIn re Guardianship of L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 70-72 (Wis. 1992) (withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment from patient in persistent vegetative state does not deprive patient of life for purposes of due process clause); see also Delio v. Westchester
County Medical Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 689-91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); In re Guardianship
of Crum, 580 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Ohio 1991) (holding that the state has no interest in preservation of life of person in persistent vegetative state).
281. Baby K, 832 F. Supp. at 1031.
282. Id. at 1029.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol98/iss1/15

42

Myerberg: The Fourth Circuit's Baby K Decision: Plain Language Does Not Mak

1995]

THE BABY K DECISION

Those who argue to keep the baby alive at all costs make the
baby an object of the right-to-life philosophy. 83 By objectifying the
baby, this degrades the baby and those who make such an argument.
The focus should be on the patient as a person, not on the patient as
reduced to a group of separate organ systems.284 The baby should be
viewed sympathetically in the reality that she presents: a hopeless accident of nature. She should not be objectified as a servant to "the
cause." To allow Baby K to die does not mean our country or physicians will give up on the thousands of handicapped and aged Americans who have a chance at some quality of life.
F. Ethical Conflicts Inherent in the Decision
The Fourth Circuit cursorily dismissed the ethical concerns of the
physicians caring for Baby K.285 Profound ethical questions related to
autonomy of patient and physician decision-making, allocation of scarce
resources, and patient competence are raised by the Baby K decision.
These issues have far-reaching consequences at a time when our country faces spiralling health care costs and rationing of health care. The
Fourth Circuit has used the plain language of EMTALA to avoid these
questions and create a simplistic legal solution. Nonetheless, we must
address these ethical questions as we face health care needs of the next
century. Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit refused to address these
questions.286
1. Non-Rational Autonomous Coercion 287
The foundation of our free society is individual autonomy.288 Au283. George J. Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency Care The Case of Baby K, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1542, 1544 (1994).
284. Id.
285. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597.
286. Id. at 598 ("[i]t is beyond the limits of our judicial function to address the moral
or ethical propriety of providing emergency stabilizing medical treatment to anencephalic
infants").
287. Gauthier, supra note 47, at 35.
288. Id. at 33; see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATSES OF GOVERNMENT 288-89 (Peter
Laslett ed., 1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
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tonomy is classically described as a negative-freedom from interference,
not as a positive-freedom to receive or be given something." 9 When
a person demands that all possible medical care be given to sustain
life, regardless of a predictable, devastating outcome, she or he is asking to be given something positive in the name of autonomy. This
person takes from the limited resources of the society to appease his or
her irrational beliefs.9 This is non-rational autonomous coercion,
which is now codified in EMTALA and endorsed by the Fourth Circuit. Thus, any patient or surrogate must be given the stabilization that
" ' The
they demand or the hospital and physicians violate EMTALA.29
number of such cases where physicians must deal with these demands
may be increasing.292 However, there are occasional cases such as
Gilgunn v. Massachusetts General Hospital where a jury has disallowed such coercion.293
Ms. H's demands for extraordinary care of Baby K were non-rational autonomous coercion. Requiring the hospital to provide ventilator
and intensive care for Baby K is costly and sends the message that our
country will support coercion when it relates to end-of-life health care
decisions. No longer does the physician determine the reasonable options of treatment, now the patient decides. We must determine whether providing highly technical care is worth the expenditure at the end
of life.294 When we are faced with a patient for whom this expense
will be futile, we must determine what values our society will apply to
justly distribute its resources.295 It is more important in some cases
senting) (stating that the right to be left alone is the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized man).
289. Gauthier, supra note 47, at 33.
290. Kapp, supra note 13, at 175 (citing Edward R. Grant, Medical Futility: Legal and
Ethical Aspects, 20 LAW MED. HEALTH CARE 330 (1992)).
291. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597.
292. Brian McCormick, Families, Physicians Increasingly in Conflict over Termination
of Care, 34 AM. MED. NEWS 1 (1991).
293. See Gina Kolata, Court Ruling Limits Rights of Patients: Care Deemed Futile May
be Withheld, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1995, at 6. (Discussing the case of Katherine Gilgunn,
who died on August 10, 1989, after her doctors issued a do-not-resuscitate order over her
family's objections. The jury in the case returned a verdict in favor of the defendant health
care providers.).
294. Gauthier, supra note 47.
295. Id. at 35.
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for a society as a whole to decide equitably than to bow to autonomy
in every instance.
2. The Issues of Competence and Reasonableness
In Baby K, the Hospital did not challenge Ms. H's competence for
medical decision-making, so the court did not address this issue. However, patient competence, or alternatively surrogate competence, must
be assured before physicians are required to comply with specific demands for medical care.296
Ms. H was intelligent, well-informed, and understood the baby's
prognosis. Therefore, she was generally competent to make the treatment decision about Baby K.297 However, we must ask whether her
decision was reasonable. It was only reasonable in the context of her
fundamentalist faith and was contrarily far afield from the norms of
the medical profession. Society should not be responsible for providing
treatment at this extreme, and such treatment should not be validated
by our courts. Unfortunately, such extreme beliefs have been allowed
by other courts when dealing with similar situations, 298 and reasonableness of the decisions has not been considered. One court did address reasonableness in a similar case involving a severely impaired infant.299 A Michigan court in In re Achtabowski suspended the
mother's parental rights and appointed a guardian. The guardian then
decided to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from the infant. 00 How-

296. MEISEL, supra note 72, at 172.
297. See id. at 188.
298. Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Mass. 1978) (holding that a court's
belief that a person's decision is "irrational" does not make the person incompetent); In re
Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Minn. P. Ct. July 1, 1991), reprinted in 7 IssuEs L. & MED.
369, 371 (1991) (A hospital sought to have the husband of a brain-damaged woman declared incompetent to make treatment decisions for her. The court found that "other than
proving that [Mr.] Wanglie does not accept the advice and counsel of the physicians . . .
[there has been] no evidence that [Mr.] Wanglie is incompetent" to make treatment decisions

for his wife.).
299. Bopp & Coleson, supra note 55, at 822 (citing In re Achtabowski, No. G93142173-GD (Mich. P. Ct. July 30, 1993) (mother found incompetent when she refused to
discontinue respirator care on a severely impaired premature infant)).
300. Id.
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ever, this case is the exception to the rule that if the patient's surrogate
is competent, then their decisions are assumed reasonable by the court.
The Baby K case clearly shows that this rule is flawed. Ms. H was
competent, but her decision was not reasonable.
G. Restoring Physician Autonomy
Destroying EMTALA

and Existing Law

without

The Fourth Circuit's interpretation of EMTALA in Baby K has
propelled an ethical question from the privacy of the doctor-patient
relationship into the legal battlefield. Ethical and medical standards of
care for terminally ill patients are uncertain because of EMTALA.3"'
In response to this uncertainty, specialty physician groups must exert
their influence on Congress to amend EMTALA to permit decisions
that are medically appropriate in accordance with current medical standards.
1.

Consensus Guideline Development by Medical Specialty
Groups

Medical specialty groups have developed consensus guidelines for
withdrawing and withholding life-sustaining treatment in certain limited
cases.0 2 However, the Fourth Circuit held that such guidelines are
inconsequential to the plain language of EMTALA. °a Medicine must
strive to clarify these guidelines in order to more effectively deal with
requests for life prolonging measures." 4 Physicians and sub-specialty
groups must create a spirit of "openness, due process, and meticulous
accountability.""3 By creating this environment, it is more likely that
patients and surrogates will (1) understand the slim odds for recovery
in specific instances, (2) trust that the physician believes withdrawing
or withholding care is in the best interests of the patient, and (3) make

301.
302.
303.
304.

See supra Part V.D.2.
Miles, supra note 11.
Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597.
Norman Daniels, The Ideal Advocate and Limited Resources 8 THEOR. MED. 69-80

(1987).
305. Miles, supra note 11.
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a rational decision. In turn, the individuals in these families will feel
more confidence in their physicians and will be more likely to support
physician groups in the legislative process of ratifying these standards.
If specialty groups succeed, they will provide physicians with
meticulous data on a patient's chance of survival. Armed with this
information, physicians will be less troubled when explaining the limited treatment alternatives that are reasonable. Given the fact that clear
guidelines exist for anencephalias, it would have been reasonable for
the physicians at the Hospital to refuse to use a ventilator on Baby K
from birth. Whatever the outcome, the physicians would have been
clearly within the medically accepted standard of care." 6
Congress passed EMTALA without foreseeing the problem presented by Baby K. However, medical specialty groups are in part to blame.
Medical specialty groups should actively continue to develop standards,
and energetically help to form the social consensus necessary to guide
legislation." 7
Along with practice guidelines, specialty groups should develop
guidelines for palliative treatments for debilitation and pain. All guidelines should be presented to patients in standard informed consent procedures."' This would allow the patient to be transferred if indicated,
to achieve an understanding about why a particular therapy will or will
not be used, and to avoid any suggestion of covert or deceptive decision-making. °9
Reasonable withdrawal of care should be as important to medical
specialty groups as are other therapeutic decisions. Guidelines cannot
be based solely on medicine's ability to keep patients alive, because
medicine can keep patients alive through nearly total devastation. Con-

306. See supra note 3.
307. See supra note 11.
308. 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE

43 (1982)
("[I]nformed consent does not mean that patients can insist upon anything they might want.
).
...
Rather, it is a choice among medically accepted and available options.
309. Miles, supra note 11, at 514 (citing American Thoracic Society Position Paper,
Withholding and Withdrawing Life-sustaining Therapy, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 478
AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND BEHAVIORAL, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS

(1991)).
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trary to the adage that physicians should only deal with physiology of
the living, specialty groups must grapple with the ultimate goal for a
given treatmenf 10 and the economic realities of that treatment.3 '
There are many voices pleading with Congress to legislate end-of-life
decisions. Perhaps, if medical specialty groups speak with strong and
clear voices on these issues, Congress will formulate policy that reflects a clinician's view.
2. An Amendment to EMTALA
Unless other circuit courts and the Supreme Court are quick to
contradict the Fourth Circuit, Congress should amend EMTALA to
support stabilization with medically appropriate care in accordance with
current medical standards. Such an amendment is needed to prevent
patients from demanding and receiving care that is not indicated according to these standards. Moreover, it would limit costs and secure
"fairness to [citizens] who have pooled their resources (by purchasing
health insurance) to assure their collective access to appropriate health
312
care."
The ideal amendment should conform with Medicare law,1 3 protecting the Medicare system from expenditures on services that are the
whim of unreasonable patients, and conform with the intent of the
Child Abuse Amendments of 1984.Y It would bring EMTALA into
reasonable accord with the Rehabilitation Ace 5 and with the Americans with Disabilities Act.3 "6 Finally, such an amendment would shift
malpractice controversies back into state court where they belong.31 7

310. Daniel Callahan, Medical Futility, Medical Necessity: The Problem Without a
Name, HASTINGS CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 30.
311. Conny Davinroy Beatty, Case of No Consent: The DNR Order as a Medical Decision, 31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 699, 715 (1987); Michael Rie, The Limits of a Wish, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., July-Aug. 1991, at 27 (suggesting the costs and tangential benefits of unrestrained patient or surrogate choice must be taken into account by the community).
312. Miles, supra note 11.
313. See supra Part V.C.1.
314. See supra Part V.C.2.
315. See supra Part V.C.3.a.
316. See supra Part V.C.3.b.
317. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Michie 1992).
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The Fourth Circuit itself has acknowledged that the area of medical decision-making is best left to physicians. In commenting on
EMTALA, the Fourth Circuit stated that even in its weakest moments,
Congress would not have attempted to impose federal control of such
personal health care decisions. Rather, the statute was designed narrowly to correct a specific abuse: hospital dumping of indigent or uninsured emergency patients." 8
After such an amendment is passed, in similar cases (like Baby K),
physicians would feel free to tell the baby's surrogate that such lifesustaining treatment is not offered to a baby with anencephaly. Without
using a mechanical ventilator, physicians would provide the comfort
measures uniformly given in the past. Such measures would avoid
spending nearly half a million dollars on the intensive care of a baby
without a brain.
3. Political Realities: Will Resolution be Possible?
An amendment to EMTALA would provide a reasonable resolution
to the conflicts enumerated in this Comment. EMTALA would remain
intact, functioning to prevent patient "dumping." The constitutional
framework used by the district court in Baby K would be altered only
for the few cases where parents object to clearly articulated medical
standards as in the case of anencephaly and Baby K.
However, there are substantial forces that will likely work against
such an amendment. First, such an amendment would amount to a
form of rationing of medical care, and Congress seems unwilling to
ration. A prime example of this is the failure to ration dialysis for end
stage renal disease. Congress's response to rationing dialysis in the
1960s and 1970s was to provide dialysis for all who qualified through
Medicare.319
Second, the present American welfare system encourages the misinterpretation of autonomy to mean that individuals are entitled to

318. Brooks, 996 F.2d at 710.
319. Arnold S. Relman & Drummond Rennie, Treatment of End Stage Renal Disease,
Free but Not Equal, 303 NEW ENG. J. MED. 996 (1980).
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goods and services from the society. This contrasts with the classical
meaning of autonomy - freedom from interference. Entitlements have
extended into health care through Medicare and Medicaid, and
EMTALA embodies such an entitlement. The Fourth Circuit's extension of EMTALA to mandate "emergency treatment on demand" is in
accord with these other entitlements.
Third, the "right-to-life" forces that were organized around the
opposition to abortion have forged an alliance with those advocating
"disability rights" and those opposed to the "right-to-die."32 Each of
these groups has reason to oppose a standard of care amendment to
EMTALA and would likely do so with vigor. To anti-abortion groups,
supporting Baby K avoids the slippery slope of infanticide. To disability rights advocates, supporting Baby K furthers their goal of preventing
the wholesale elimination of the elderly and disabled. To those opposed
to the "right to die," supporting Baby K furthers their goal of preventing the premature "extermination" of the terminally ill. Those favoring
a standard of care amendment to EMTALA must be highly organized
and persistent to overcome this principled opposition.
Fourth, medical specialty groups have ample data on the futility of
" ' but none of these
certain medical interventions,32
has evolved into
guidelines which Congress has used as a model of end-of-life decisionmaking. Although inundated with data, there is no attempt to prune the
ever expanding tree of end-of-life medical efforts.
Finally, the fact that Baby K was an infant may prevent many
politicians from entering the battle for an amendment. Thus, a different
type of case may need to surface before such an amendment is possible.
These obstacles can be overcome. Congress is on the verge of
major Medicare and Medicaid cutbacks which will require rationing of
320. See University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 145-46 (A. Lawrence Washburn, Jr., a right-tolife attorney, commenced this litigation where parents withheld care from a handicapped
newborn. The U.S. Attorney appealed the matter, and the Western Law Center for the
Handicapped, The American Coalition of Citizens With Disabilities, The Association For
Retarded Citizens, The Association For The Severely Handicapped, Disabled In Action of
Metropolitan New York, and The Disabled Rights Union filed briefs for the appellant.).
321. Miles, supra note 11.
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care. Amending EMTALA in accord with consensus medical standards
is one way Congress could cut costs.
The proposed amendment does not advocate infanticide, termination of the elderly, or extermination of the disabled. Clear cut guidelines for end-of-life decisions are rare, and when they do exist, they
are addressed at those very close to death. Additionally, anti-abortion
advocates, disability rights advocates and those opposed to the "right to
die" must play a pivotal role in the consensus guidelines that are
reached. Balance can be achieved as it was in the Child Abuse
Amendments of 1984.
There is accurate data on the efficacy of certain emergency interventions. For example, the use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation for the
elderly322 and for patients with metastatic cancer323 reveal extremely
poor outcomes. As well, neurologically intact survival in very low birth
weight infants is extremely rare.32 Not all of the potential guidelines
relate to handicapped newborns. Congress and specialty groups can join
forces to determine what is reasonable care in a limited number of
emergency circumstances.
V1.

CONCLUSION

The Fourth Circuit has construed the clear language of EMTALA
literally, holding that hospitals must provide stabilization on demand of
any patient. However, the court's reasoning in support of this construction is faulty when applied to Baby K. Existing federal law is ignored
or glossed over, state law on medical standards is brushed aside, and
fine points of constitutional law are left out. Unfortunately, hospitals
now have a mandate for emergency stabilization that does not comport
with the principles that govern all other medical care. Although Congress should amend EMTALA so that stabilization will be in accord

322. Donald J. Murphy et al., Outcomes of CPR in the Elderly, 11I ANNALS INTERNAL
199 (1989).
323. Faber-Langendoen, supra note 185.
324. John D. Lantos et al., Survival After Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation in Babies of
Very Low Birth Weight: Is CPR Futile Therapy, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 91 (1988).

ME.
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with accepted standards of medical care, the passage of such an
amendment will be a difficult battle.
David Zell Myerberg, MD.
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